Latest Expert Report Reached to Court in Corlu Train Massacre Case

In the corlu train massacre case, the last expert report reached the court
In the corlu train massacre case, the last expert report reached the court

Uzunköprü-Halkalı On 08.07.2018, in the case of the death of 25 passengers and the injury of 328 passengers as a result of their wagons being off the road in Tekirdağ Province Çorlu District Balabanlı Village Sarılar on 1, the last expert report was the 6th hearing of the case held at the XNUMXst High Criminal Court of Çorlu He reached the court.

The United Transport Workers Union made a comprehensive assessment of the expert report and filed a criminal complaint against the names responsible for the massacre.

The evaluation report prepared by the United Transport Workers Union regarding the expert report is as follows;

Although we see the final stage of the case and the latest expert report positively, we think that there are some technical and legal deficiencies especially in the expert report.

Before making detailed evaluations, we would like to state that as a union, the real responsible persons should be brought to court in this case, and that we long for a country where, as has not been done for years, starting with the bureaucrats, those involved in the political decision-making mechanisms can also be tried.

As a union, we believe that many factors such as transportation policies, privatization and subcontracting, and personnel regime, which have been maintained for years, should be evaluated as complicated in evaluating the causes and consequences of this massacre, and that all factors in the occurrence of the incident will remain incomplete and cannot be understood when we go through the direct result.

1-Since the issue in the expert report stating that "infrastructure is not renewed and this is a need" was not evaluated in full, lacking aspects remained.

Due to the different infrastructure-superstructure works carried out over the years, "Halkalı-Çerkezköy” and ”Çerkezköy-Uzunköprü-Kapıkule "to be handled in 2 parts is important for a better understanding of the subject.

a) Halkalı-Çerkezköy inter-rail zone
The rainfall in the railway section of the Thrace Region, wrong agricultural policies and tillage, erosion, flood, etc. due to damage to the superstructure and infrastructure Halkalı-Çerkezköy Infrastructure between 2012 and 2014 was improved. During this period, Çerkezköy-Halkalı railway line section remained closed.

Çerkezköy-Halkalı The biggest factor in deciding on infrastructure renewal and rehabilitation in the inter-rail section was the great flood between Kabakça-Kurfalı stations in 2009 and landslides in the following period. are events. After this flood, infrastructure rehabilitation was carried out in line with the decision taken with the delegation from TCDD General Directorate. However, in the rehabilitation process, only renovations were made by taking into account the dimensions of the old culverts without using up-to-date hydraulic data and / or obtaining from the State Hydraulic Works. Public resources were wasted due to the lack of hydraulic scrutiny, and although infrastructure improvement is still made today, Halkalı-Çerkezköy flooding between, the risk of overflow continues. This is true in all the lines is made to investigation of fluid in Turkey.

b) Çerkezköy-Uzunköprü / Kapıkule railway zone (Muratlı is in this region)
Incoming delegations and TCDD 1st Regional Road Directorate officials and the officials of the regional directorate to which they were affiliated, without being clear what scientific data were taken into account, ÇerkezköyThey decided that there is no need to renew the infrastructure for the period after. And in 2011, tables / reports were prepared stating that only the renewal of the superstructure would be sufficient, and the decision and implementation in this direction was continued by all responsible TCDD 2018st Regional Directorate until the accident in 1.

This important detail was not noticed in the expert report!

While preparing the expert report, it must be because retrospective chronological events were not analyzed sufficiently, this part was missing in the report.

And as stated in the expert report, it is necessary to rehabilitate the infrastructure in this region and TCDD has still not taken a step to renew the infrastructure, although 2,5 years have passed since the accident, and thus acted with the claim that the infrastructure of the region is indirectly in good condition. However, since there is no work on the area, it is inevitable to have the same accident in the grill one behind or one behind the grill where the accident occurred.

Since this historical process was not noticed in the expert report, those responsible for this title could not be clarified either!

At this point, Mümin Karasu, who used to be a branch chief in the region for years and served as TCDD 1st Regional Railway Maintenance Service Manager Deputy on the day of the accident, Nizamettin ARAS, who was the assistant in charge of Infrastructure on the day of the incident (now serving as the 1st Regional Maintenance Service Manager), is responsible for the superstructure. Deputy manager Levent Kaytan is responsible for the preparation of this table and taking decisions (due to their duty during all these years), and their absence of any warnings / demands on this issue despite the 7 years passed is a continuation of this flaw.

Another flaw in the fact that these people are on duty for all these years belongs to TCDD General Managers in the 2011-year period between 2018-7! Because these 3 personnel were assigned at different times in their service manager positions, although they were not graduates of technical faculties and did not have qualifications. Despite the fact that 2,5 years have passed since the accident, the fact that we have not been appointed to this position in person for the last 1 year and the deputy service manager Nizamettin Aras, whom we believe was responsible for the incident, is a separate fault, although he is not a technical faculty graduate.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: Since this issue was not clearly stated in the expert report, the interim decision of the 6th review was inevitably missing in terms of determining the responsibilities and degrees of responsibility.

2-In the expert report, the scientific and legal inadequacies of the "TCDD 1st Regional Railway Maintenance Service Directorate managers" were never emphasized.

On the day of the accident, Mümin Karasu, who was acting as a proxy for the service directorate, was appointed to a noble staff for 6 years, although they did not meet the requirements of the noble. This person is not a technical faculty graduate, and among the requirements for the principal staff of this service manager, there is the obligation to be a technical faculty graduate. And even now, Nizamettin Aras, who is one of those who prepared a table in the accident area in order to "not renew the infrastructure" and who has made the relevant correspondence over the years, by proxy to this service directorate, and this person does not meet the requirements of the noble since he is not a technical faculty graduate.

The General Directorate of TCDD has had this service directorate (formerly known as the road directorate, new name railway maintenance directorate) inspected by power of attorney and assignments for more than 10 years, which is a serious fault legally. In addition to the legal fault, none of the personnel who perform this duty by proxy or with the phrase of their place do not meet the requirements of the principal.

In the 10-year period only, after the dismissal of Mümin Karasu after the accident, a permanent staff appointment (Mahmut Civan with the engineering title) was made for 1,5 years. And for the last year, this staff is being exercised by proxy / assignment.

The actions taken by Mahmut Civan, who was appointed to the service manager after the accident, revealed the fault of the previous attorneys.

In the expert report, the issue of "backside dam to the culvert where the boiler is located, the reinforcement structure (sliding), the arrangement of the conduit and the operation of two 300-sized pipe culverts instead of the 2 mm first pipe culvert to the adjacent culvert" was made by Mahmut Civan, the service manager with this engineer title. . This situation clearly showed the inadequacy and flaws of Mümin Karasu, the former deputy service manager. Moreover, Mümin Karasu was dismissed approximately 1000 month after the accident.

Also; The dismissal of Isa APAYDIN, who was the General Director of TCDD, and Fahrettin Yıldırım, who was the Head of Railway Maintenance Department, on the day of the accident, also strengthens the suspicion of defects in the incident.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: In the expert report, this technical and legal situation is incomplete as no mention has been made. This deficiency also affected the interim decision of the 6th examination, and no decision was taken by the court on this matter.

The decision of the court, "The adequacy of the railway infrastructure, filling etc. materials, the impact on the accident by evaluating the railway route and culvert and platform widths, the comparative evaluation of the state of the railway infrastructure and superstructure before, during and after the accident" is welcomed, although the differences between the relevant responsibilities should also be determined.

3- In the expert report, the issue of "The report of Mümin Karasu, the deputy railway maintenance service manager of the period who published the tour report, was not an objective and scientific report", but it was stated that the instructions given by the person concerned were far from seriousness and objectivity.

Mümin Karasu's tour report, "The data obtained from the General Directorate of Meteorology (MGM)" are not specific to the region and the day, and they are not officially provided, that is, they go beyond estimation. There is already a 2-week period between the tour report and the accident, and this article was written for the entire region from Eskişehir to Edirne-Kapıkule. In other words, it is an article that is intended only for estimation, does not specifically include any registered regions, does not give any information about the weather on the day of the incident, does not warn (for the accident area).

It was revealed that the person concerned mentioned something called “tropical climate rain”, which he did not understand and put the information he heard from the press into his tour report.

On the day of the accident, it was officially reported by the Tekirdağ Governorship Meteorology Directorate that there was 32,4mm of precipitation. 32,4mm precipitation is defined as 1rd degree heavy precipitation in the classification from 6 to 3 in the definitions made by the General Directorate of Meteorology. So there is no tropical rainfall. In the expert report, the precipitation rate in the region could not be stated clearly due to the different data of different stations.

Mümin Karasu did not stand behind his tour report and the tropical rainfall warning he mentioned here, on the day of the accident, the personnel in the area where the accident occurred, not to prevent this extraordinary rain event, but to another place. ÇerkezköyIt is clear with the commissioning event for the switch replacement in!

While these issues were not included in the expert report, some explanations were given about the order "to leave guards everywhere" regarding Mümin Karasu. In the report; "Stating that leaving on duty in critical weather conditions is not possible without a connection with meteorology and that this will be subjective" shows that the mentioned article is "far from seriousness and objectivity", and did not give any warning about the area on the day of the incident, did not assign any personnel, barely enough staff, ÇerkezköyIt has once again been revealed that Mümin Karasu, who appointed him for the change of scissors, was the main responsible.

On the day of the incident, the existing personnel also Çerkezköyhis assignment for ALL DAY TIME completely refuted the relevant person's own order.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: Despite the fact that the defendants and their lawyers were informed about this issue during the course of the case, the court had not asked why the staff were asked for the change of scissors even though there was no day of the incident or working day. ÇerkezköyThe executives who have responsibilities in this order, publishing a tour report and giving orders on the contrary of the report, the deputy service manager Mümin Karasu, who gave these orders, etc. issues have never been the subject of interim decisions. Finally, since this issue was not addressed in the expert report, no new decision was made.

We think that the decision made in the interim decision on "How the data based on hydraulic and hydrological evaluation and the data of farms and measurement stations close to the accident site are taken as basis" will not be effective in understanding the causes of the accident.

4-TCDD does not have any legal / organic affiliation with the General Directorate of Meteorology, nor does it have warning systems. Sending e-mails or SMS to the personnel after the accident is also an effort to hide the responsibility. This issue was not brought up in the expert report.

Until the accident happened, TCDD did not work with MGM under any conditions and did not employ meteorology engineers / experts. After the accident, TCDD management, which attempted to hide its crime, gave all mobile phones and corporate e-mail addresses to MGM without the permission and approval of the personnel. Subsequently, a continuous SMS message and e-mail bombardment occurred. In these mails and SMS; The staff (especially road maintenance chiefs) of the area they are not responsible for weather reports, all of Turkey is located in the weather report. In fact, just because of this mail and SMS bombardment, the inbox of the e-mail addresses of the personnel is over / filled. Be related to the coming weather forecast in Turkey in general, has created a psychological frustration in terms of personnel, there is no seriousness of such messages.

This aspect of the issue was never mentioned in the expert report. However, TCDD administrations have done / are doing this type of legal cover-finding incidents behind almost every accident. Immediately after the Pamukova train disaster, the kilometer plates, none of which were seen before, were quickly changed, and in the YHT accident in Ankara, it was said that there is no need for a signal.

Regarding the request of Turgut Kurt, one of the defendants, to obtain information about precipitation / forecast codes from meteorology in 2016, it is again the fault of the senior management that no action or solution was found until the accident occurred!

If there is a VERY IMPORTANT detail about this issue overlooked in the expert report; In the subparagraph (105) of Article 4 titled Duties of the Road Manager (Railway Maintenance Service Manager) of the general order 3, which is one of the railway maintenance legislation of TCDD; "To prepare the correspondence, documents, information, projects and protocols about the other Institution and third parties in its field within the knowledge of the Regional Manager". This means: The Railway Maintenance Service Manager could obtain information from the General Directorate of Meteorology or to make a protocol within the knowledge of the regional manager, within his authority. However, he never did this during his 6 years in office! BUT this protocol was made suddenly after the accident! This situation clearly shows the fault of the person concerned.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: Since there was no lawyer in the expert who made technical examination on physical documents, responsibilities and defects in terms of legislation could not be seen. At the point of making a protocol with MGM after the accident and starting to send weather forecasts to the mobile and corporate e-mail addresses of the personnel, the issues why this was not done before, the person authorized to do this was not questioned in the interim decision, and no decision was taken regarding the request for documents / information from the TCDD administration in this direction. For this reason, it is not currently possible for people with upward responsibilities to question "this aspect of the event", especially the Deputy TCDD 1st Regional Railway Maintenance Service Manager of the period, and the interim decision of the 6th hearing is incomplete.

5-The first degree responsible for taking into account the reports demanding "ballast retainer manufacturing" for the culvert where the accident occurred, Nizamettin Aras, who was the deputy service manager of the period and currently acting as the service manager, Levent Kaytan, the deputy manager of the 1st region railway maintenance service of the period, Mümin Karasu, who is the Deputy Service Manager, and Nihat Aslan, the Regional Manager, are responsible jointly and at the 1st degree, and this issue was not questioned in detail and on the basis of crime / responsibility in the expert report.

As stated in the joint reports prepared by the bridge crew chief and the Road Maintenance Chief in 2017 and 2018; It is stated that ballast retainer manufacturing is required in the culvert area where the boiler is located.

This issue was also taken into consideration in the expert report, and attention was drawn to not including ONE ONLY THIS GRILL in the tender list. It has been clearly revealed that this is a flaw, both with the expert report and, until this report, by the construction of this wall, even the injection of concrete and the rocking, by the service manager who has the engineer's title appointed after the dismissal of Mümin Karasu.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: The court did not include this issue in its interim decision, and did not request written information / documents or defense statements from the General Directorate of TCDD regarding why there was no "ballast retaining wall" in this region. However, if this wall had been built, it is also possible that the materials under the road that caused the accident would not drift with the water and the legal responsibilities of those who caused this deficiency are fixed.

6-In the expert report, agricultural practices in the region where the accident occurred, changing / changing the direction of the river / stream bed for these reasons, farm etc. The connection of the management levels, who did not take timely measures for the drainage of the floors / did not do technical work in line with engineering science, was not clearly emphasized.

In the expert report, it is stated that there are 313 hectares of agricultural land around the accident area, 22 hectares of which belong to a farm. It is also stated in this report that although the slope in the soil (field) is 3%, the farmers plow the land incorrectly / vertically, causing erosion. In addition to these, it should be added that the farmers dug water channels into their own land through the stream beds for irrigation, playing with the stream beds. Likewise, it is another fact that the rainwater drainage of the large farms and other settlements in the region gave this stream.

While all these external factors should be evaluated by the expert department of TCDD General Directorate and within the framework of engineering science and the infrastructure policy should be determined accordingly, TCDD management did not do these, "only for 6 years", belonging to Mümin Karasu, who is ministering the service directorate on the day of the accident, He tried to make people do this task. This situation makes all the senior executives of that period legally responsible, starting from Mümin Karasu, up to (including) the General Manager.

In fact, in the expert report, it was insistently emphasized that the railway slope was left unprotected, and although there were dozens of engineers (construction, geology, map, etc.) working for the Regional Service Directorate, no tests related to the infrastructure were ordered in a scientific study. Institutional managers who do not investigate and resolve this in a timely manner are clearly responsible.

In-depth research and results on these issues are not encountered in the expert report.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: The court made its decision on "the driving direction of the agricultural lands at the accident site, the impact of the farm canals on the accident in the basin" is correct and proper. In their re-studies, they should definitely be evaluated together with the changing agricultural policies over the years.

7-The determination of the 300 mm pipe culvert, which is the neighboring grille of the grill where the accident is mentioned in the expert report, is not concrete and as it is proved otherwise, the deputy service manager of the period, Mümin Karasu, who gave a statement to the court as a “witness”, by order of The fact that he slandered the acting personnel was not expressed in the report.

Regarding the pipe culvert with a diameter of 300 mm, the bridge team chief Çetin Yıldırım and the road maintenance chief Özkan Polat, in the inspection report 2 months before the accident, the relevant road maintenance chief Özkan Polat, again on the road control tour 2 days before the accident, Line Maintenance Officer Celalettin Çubuk on various dates, They made cleaning in that culvert with the worker with a digging-shovel ”and the Road Surveyor in the region stated that they had been working at these points for 4 days with a bucket belonging to TCDD and this pipe vent was open.

As presented to the court by the defendant's lawyers and verbally declared various times, these are satellite images showing that this culvert was open on the day of the accident, and these images were presented to the court.

In addition, this grill was replaced by the service manager who was appointed as a principal in place of Mümin Karasu, who was dismissed a while after the accident, and a new 1000 mm diameter pipe grille was installed.

Therefore, the fact that Mümin Karasu, the deputy service manager of the period, who did not give an opinion about whether the 300 mm pipe culvert would be sufficient or not, did not give orders or made a request to the upper authority, did nothing and did not mention it in any tour report, indicating the guilt of the concerned person. Nevertheless, Mümin Karasu made an accusation about the personnel in her statement and LIE stated that “this culvert was closed”.

When the expert report on the subject was prepared, this pipe culvert had been replaced months ago, the report did not prove that this culvert was closed on the day of the incident, and instead an ambiguous expression was used as “either it was closed or it did not provide adequate drainage”.

Therefore, this part of the expert report lacked both an objective basis and due to the lack of examination, no determination or responsibility was made for the top management, which is their main responsibility.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: If there had been a detailed study on this subject in the expert report, this would have been reflected in the court decision. Because of the possible responsibility and negligence regarding the mentioned culverts and infrastructure, starting from Nizamettin Aras, the deputy service manager responsible for the infrastructure of the period, Mümin Karasu, Deputy Service Manager, and 1st Regional Manager M.Levent Meriçli, to whom the Maintenance Service Directorate was attached ( Geological Engineer) and was going up to Nihat Aslan, the 1st Regional Director. However, since this issue was lacking in the expert report, this issue was not mentioned at all in the interim decision given in the 6th review.

8-In the expert report; It was not mentioned that EKAY (DERY) directorates, whose responsibility was put forward and which is the unit responsible for preparing the Safety Management System risk analysis report, have no relation / knowledge with their own professional field and that this structure has no scientific feature.

The unit / directorate / department that prepares the risk analysis reports was established within TCDD with administrative logic, and the appointments made to these units have nothing to do with the relevant laws. These are directorates that issue reports "according to the orders from above" and do not go beyond being bureaucratic. And when preparing their reports, they are not based on scientific or engineering data. In any case, these directorates do not have engineers and experts on the subject. This department, which makes a risk analysis for a "completely technical" department such as railway maintenance, is completely unfamiliar with the subject and they send their reports to the technical units. In other words, instead of evaluating the reports they receive from technical units, on the contrary, technical units operate according to the reports of this department.

While this part of the expert report escaped attention, it was once again understood with the “unacceptable risk” report that these units within the body of TCDD behave politically, contrary to previous years!

As mentioned in the expert report, Cemal Yaşar TANGÜL, who is responsible for the 1st degree EYS (EKAY) manager in the 1st regional directorate of the railway where the accident occurred, and Nihat Aslan, the 1st Region Manager of the period, in the sense of responsibility, and Cemal Yaşar TANGÜL, who is now a top position, is the 1st Regional Deputy Manager. engages!

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: In the expert report; Since the responsibility is not shared and the responsibility is not personalized, it has been decided to file a criminal complaint with a court decision for now. This is a positive step, albeit delayed.

9-In the expert report; While the absence or lack of "road guard" was emphasized, the administrative punishment and exile processes applied to some defendants could not be included in an article on this subject (due to the differences between dates).

In the expert report, the issue of vacant or too little road guard staff was mentioned, while the question of why the TCDD general directorate did not recruit this staff was not thoroughly examined and the defect was not personalized. However, it is possible for workplace supervisors to write articles on this subject and request personnel. Mümin Karasu, who is the first-degree addressee of the subject, saw articles from sub-units about the lack of personnel during the deputy service manager for 1 years. However, despite this, he did not take any action, even though the staff was almost non-existent, he wrote the ambiguous article in question. And it is completely unclear whether this person wrote articles on this subject to higher authorities, whether he followed the results, and if he received a negative response, what precautions he took against it.

In addition, no manager-supervisor going upwards starting from Mümin Karasu, who was ministering to the service directorate on the day of the accident, had the authority to purchase "road watchman" services from third parties (which is the implementation of TCDD Malatya 3th Regional Directorate within the scope of its authority. Even after the accident until and after the accident, he still did not take any precautions and did not use his powers.

Considering that no personnel has been employed in the title of road guard until today, the responsibility; Starting from Mümin Karasu, who was ministering the railway maintenance service directorate on the day of the accident, TCDD 1st Regional Deputy Manager M.Levent Meriçli, TCDD 1st Regional Manager Nihat Aslan, Head of Railway Maintenance Department Fahrettin Yıldırım, TCDD General Manager of the period Deputy and current general manager Ali İhsan Uygun, TCDD General Manager at the time İsa Apaydın and to the previous and current Minister of Transport and Infrastructure.

It was revealed with the letter that was included in the case file of the Çorlu train accident about the need for a road guard, which was not mentioned in the expert report but that TCDD administration accepted the responsibility and the crime of the incident. Due to the reflection of the issue in the press, the TCDD administration, which has already initiated an investigation about the personnel who have been tried as defendants / witnesses in this file, tried to spread pressure and fear in order not to submit "evidential" documents to the case. And although they did not have any concrete evidence, these personnel were given unfair administrative penalties and suspended for 2,5 months. And subsequently, these personnel were exiled from different provinces.

Of the defendants Halkalı 14 railway maintenance manager, Turgut Kurt, to Sivas, one of the defendants, Halkalı Road Maintenance Chief Çetin Yıldırım was exiled to Yozgat Şefaatli, while Tevfik Baran Önder, who was heard as a witness in the case, was exiled to Sivas. This is an open intervention to the case and an effort to cover up the responsibilities of those who are under the management of TCDD and who have responsibilities in this accident.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: Although this situation was brought to the agenda by the defendant's lawyers in the 6th examination of the court, it is a legal deficiency that no special decision was taken by the court regarding this administrative practice of the TCDD General Directorate, which prevents the healthy course of the court and the right to a fair trial.

10-Mümin Karasu did not act ethically and committed an administrative and judicial crime by submitting her personal tour report, warning letter and personnel names according to her perception to the Prosecutor's Office, on the night of the accident, although she did not have the authority to represent legally and according to the domestic legislation of TCDD. .

It would never be a coincidence that Mümin Karasu gave her tour report and her article about the weather situation to both the prosecutor's office and a political party that made a press statement in the village of Sarılar after the incident. When this chain of events is read correctly, it will be easily understood that the incident is unlawful and denouncing and unjust accusation of the personnel under his command, that Mümin Karasu is trying to confuse the target, mislead the court, and hide his crime. The expert may naturally pass this matter as he is conducting a technical investigation.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: The Court, including the 6th Celse, who has submitted the relevant documents, whether this person has legal authority, that is, whether the TCDD general manager has transferred the authority to the person who has given the document, Mümin Karasu, who is one of the persons who was decided to file a criminal complaint in line with the latest expert report. The contradiction and the aim of giving this letter to a political party leader while giving this letter to the court is why TCDD General Directorate is not subject to investigation by TCDD General Directorate about the issue of giving this document to a political party, on the contrary, making it the consultant of the general manager, etc. There is no interim decision on the issues. We interpret this as a deficiency.

11-In the expert report; No mention was made of what technical reasons were taken into account in giving 110 km / h for the region.

UIC Speed ​​tables (UIC 703) are known to be valid when both the infrastructure and the superstructure are built in accordance with UIC standards. Using the UIC 719 standard only by renewing the superstructure and making the infrastructure compatible with the UIC 703 standard is not technical and scientific and brings a risk factor.

In the region where the accident occurred, passenger train transportation was suspended for a long time until the accident and these trains were put on the voyage again with the approval of the decision-making authorities (senior management). In such a case, naturally, the top manager (by region) of the unit responsible for the road must make this decision with his technical knowledge and experience. However, Mümin Karasu, who looks at the service directorate on the day of the accident, does not have such technical knowledge, competence and competence.

Despite all these realities and knowing that there are no road watchman titles, it was one of those who approved both the running of the passenger train and a speed that would not meet UIC qualifications. In other words, the relevant and other signatory top managers have agreed to operate the passenger train by giving 110 km / h without providing technical competence and are responsible for the accident.

Despite these bad and inadequate situations, the opening of this line to passenger transportation stands before us as a situation that needs to be investigated, since it gives the appearance of a political decision regarding the elections.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: Although there is no special evaluation in the expert report regarding the issue, although the issue was brought up by the lawyers of the complainants and defendants, no decision was taken from the court on this issue. If this issue is investigated in depth, it will be revealed that the livre speed given to the region is high, in this case, new defects may be shared about those responsible through probability calculations.

12- There is no special emphasis on the responsibility of Mümin Karasu, who is one of the most prominent names in the accident and whose first degree responsibility is understood with the expert report, and his current position in the expert report!

Although the issues mentioned in the expert report point to the personnel named Mümin Karasu in many places, personal responsibility, corporate and managerial responsibility are mentioned in the expert report. However, when Mümin Karasu, who was dismissed 1 month after the accident, had intense demands from both the defendant's lawyers and the lawyers of the complainants to be tried, and the relevant connection and crime of the relevant person was obvious, he was suddenly appointed to the title of Consultant to the General Manager in June-2020. This stands before us as a measure of the TCDD administration to protect the criminal and prevent the emergence of a possible chain of criminals.

Mümin Karasu is the key name in this case, as voiced at every hearing and by all parties. Although our request to be brought to the court as a witness was rejected every time, it was essential that Mümin Karasu entered this case as a suspect, in line with the latest expert report.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: Regarding the matter, it is a positive development that in the 6th examination decision, it was decided to make a criminal complaint against those who were on duty on the day of the accident at the authorities mentioned in the expert report. However, in the next judgment process, in-depth examination of the issues we have mentioned / objected to is very important in terms of revealing those responsible.

13- In the expert reports, it is not mentioned that the institution is managed by incompetent persons and that the unrelated municipal personnel in the departments and directorates who are experts in the subject are appointed as direct and political staffing, and the relationship between the consequences of this and the accident has not been evaluated.

TCDD has been managed like the backyard of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in recent years, personnel trained in TCDD or who have technical competence / competence are permanently disabled, and especially these administrative staff are appointed from IMM. This situation continues until today, starting with Süleyman Karaman, who came from IMM and became the General Manager of TCDD in Pamukova district. This has gained momentum after the last local elections and it has become difficult to get out of business.

Both during the time of the accident and now, many departments, board memberships and even the 1st Regional Manager are managed by people appointed from outside.

Ali İhsan Uygun, the deputy general manager and currently the general manager, who should have been responsible for the accident, came from IMM. The head of the Modernization Department, who will carry out the infrastructure renovation, comes from IMM. The Head of the Inspection Board is from IMM / İSKİ. The appointment of DIREKT personnel from outside the institution, one being the head of department and the remaining as the deputy head of department, in the expert report, is also a remarkable staffing product.

TCDD 1st Regional Railway Maintenance Service Directorate, which has the first degree responsibility in the accident, has been carried out by proxy and for unqualified persons for 1 years (excluding the period of approximately 10 years)

This list can be reproduced, but as a result of political staffing and incompetent appointment, the direct recruitment of non-railway people as top managers, many accidents have occurred since the Çorlu accident. Only 2020 accidents occurred in October-3 and 2 mechanics died.

The chain of negligence in the Çorlu accident cannot be considered apart from the responsibilities of the administrators who do not know their jobs and who are appointed politically, in this management crisis that TCDD was put into.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: Regarding the issue, especially one of the defendant's lawyers, Av. Despite the statements and statements of Ersin Albuz, no decision was made regarding this connection in the interim decision and this is a deficiency.

14- The relationship between the consequences of privatization and subcontracting and the accident has not been taken into consideration by the expert.

Railways is a well-established and complex institution, and until the last 30 years, it was an institution that was self-sufficient in many areas and was self-sustaining with its income from ports.

It was an institution that made its own production especially in road construction and superstructure road material supply. TCDD had a Rail Welding Factory, Concrete Travers Factory, and a Rail Factory. All infrastructure small connection materials were produced in TCDD workshops or factories. TCDD even had its own ballast furnaces and ballasts had to be of a certain diameter and durability, and there were laboratories where they were tested.

Until the privatization and liquidation process began, road checks were not carried out just because it rained, because there was no need for this because the employees renewed and repaired the road according to the standards and in accordance with the rule, and also with checked materials, adverse situations were foreseen and known. And an important shareholder in this flow of information was the personnel with the title of road guard.

One of the defendant lawyers, Av. As Ersin ALBUZ mentioned in his recorded speech in the 6th hearing of the court; As a result of the implementation of the reports prepared by the companies named CANAC and Booz Allen and Hamilton with the grant loans of the World Bank in general, these facilities were either closed or sold. Ballast tests are now carried out by private companies, and even rock fragments or mud are approved in the field. Personnel reception stopped. The road guard was completely removed for a while, it was reinstated after an accident in Istanbul, but this time, no personnel were generally recruited to this staff.

They gave the road constructions to private firms who, while there were railway workers, did not understand the derivation and the "d" of the railways. Railways had machines (automobiles) that were used for mechanical repair, but they even pulled them aside (deposited) and gave these jobs to private companies. These things were done so badly that the TCDD personnel, who had remained after the fingers of one hand, were on their way to correct the mistakes they made. As stated in the court, they did not easily change the infrastructure, because there were politically appointed / protected deputies (such as Mümin Karasu etc.) at the beginning of the job.

Just after the Çorlu accident, every time a cloud was seen, the personnel were sent to the road for control. However, in the expert report, the subject was not analyzed in this sense, and this contradictory situation was not revealed.

6. Evaluation in terms of interim decision: Regardless of the presentation made by the defendant's lawyers and the cause-effect relationship on this issue, no special decision has been issued by the court regarding this reality. However, this reality must be taken into account in order to understand the cause of the accident and its true responsibilities and degrees of responsibility.

When the subject is examined in depth through this reality, it can be understood why there are so many railway accidents in the last years and especially during the 18-year current ruling period, and thus new accidents and grievances can be prevented by drawing lessons.

Criminal complaint

In the light of both the last expert report, the stage the case has reached, and the 6th interim decision;

  • Deputy TCDD 1st Region Railway Maintenance Service Managers of the period, Levent Kaytan and Nizamettin Aras,
  • Mümin Karasu, who was the Deputy Director of TCDD 1st Region Railway Maintenance Service of the period,
  • Cemal Yaşar Tangül, who was the TCDD 1st Region EKAY Service Manager of the period,
  • M. Levent Meriçli, who was responsible for TCDD 1st Region Railway Maintenance Service Deputy Manager of the period,
  • Nihat Aslan, TCDD 1st Regional Director of the period,
  • President of TCDD Railway Maintenance Department of the period Fahrettin Yıldırım
  • Head of TCDD R&D Department of the period
  • TCDD Deputy General Manager / Deputy General Manager to whom TCDD Railway Maintenance Department and R&D departments were affiliated,
  • The Deputy General Manager of TCDD of the period and the current General Manager Ali İhsan Uygun,
  • TCDD General Manager of the period İsa Apaydın'of

We think that they have different responsibilities in the occurrence of the Çorlu accident and they should be tried as a suspect.

These findings and our report also serve as a criminal complaint to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Offices.

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