TCDD accused the mechanic of the dead with scissors. The scissors was not given sufficient training. When the train line entered 1, the control center was not searched. 9 The change in traffic in December caused the risk of encountering two trains.
Cumhuriyetfrom Alican Uludag; In the investigation report prepared by the TCDD Inspection Board regarding the high-speed train accident in Ankara, where 9 people died; It was claimed that the accident occurred due to the train officer O. Y's forgetting to change the scissors and YHT's three dead mechanics who did not stop the train, although they saw that they were on the wrong track. On the other hand, in the report, which also indicates the 'deficiencies' in the region where the accident occurred, the lack of adequate training for the imprisoned shearman O.Y; Instead of 1 train organizer, it was listed that 2 train organizers were not employed, there were not enough signs, when the train entered Line 1, no arrangement was made by calling the control center and reporting this situation. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the risk of confrontation between the two trains occurred by rearranging the train traffic in the region 4 days before the accident.
TCDD Inspection Board, 13 2018 9 93 54 XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX The XNUMX page report by Chief Inspector Ahmet Hamdi Yanilmaz and inspector Fatih Demir was sent to Ankara Public Prosecutor Ejder Oguz Ozdemir, who was conducting the investigation with the General Directorate of TCDD.
In the report, as the first reason of the accident, “On the 13th of December 2018, at 06.30, O.Y's trainer, who was the trainer, the shipment of the train number 11, which was ready on the 81201th Road of YHT Gar, to make the Ankara-Konya route. It should have been done in 1 way, causing it to go through the Line 2 route ”. In the report, which was told that O.Y forgot to change his M74 scissors, he was asked to be removed from the civil service.
Second reason
The second reason was the high-speed train machinists A. Y, HB and K.Ü. who were killed in the accident. YHT 8. In the traffic operating orders published by the Regional Directorate, the YHTs will be given the call of Hat 1 from Ankara YHT Gar-Esenkent direction and Hat 2 from the direction of Esenkent-Ankara YHT Gar and 1 except the road closure of the YHTs. YHT Machinists are known to watch their way.
Three 'shortcomings'
The report noted the need for additional safety measures in the new application and identified the following three 'shortcomings': Ankara YHT Gar did not make arrangements to train the train by calling the command center when it entered Hat 1.
YHT Garage 23.00 07.00 trainer 1 in the West scissors 2 trainer, rather than the staff of the XNUMX train.
-9 XTRENE 2018 11 12 13 2 1 74 1 and 2 path before connecting to the line XNUMX and XNUMX line connecting the line XNUMX scissors MXNUMX scissors with the direction information and the line XNUMX Line XNUMX information does not indicate the markings.
Scissors training not provided
In the report, “Makasçı O.Y has not been trained within the scope of the directive orders of TCDD, training has been given to O.Y for the use of the scissors assembly with the button numbered M74, and the records and documents to be kept are not kept. while this situation needs to be documented, such a document is not kept ”.
'Condemnation' to the managers
In the report, while requesting 'warn' to other arrested traffic controller EEE, 'offense' sentence for the dispatcher Sinan Yavuz; YHT 8th Regional Manager DY, Traffic and Station Management Manager Ü.S, Traffic and Station Management Assistant Manager ET and Ankara YHT Station Deputy Director K.O was requested.
A second accident prevented by 5
In the report, Sincan-Kayas running Line 2 commuter trains from 45 seconds after the accident came to the station and the stop at the scene 5 meters, stating that a second catastrophe was prevented by stating that was stopped.
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