TCDD accused the mechanic of the dead with scissors. The scissors was not given sufficient training. When the train line entered 1, the control center was not searched. 9 The change in traffic in December caused the risk of encountering two trains.
CumhuriyetNews from Alican Uludağ; TCDD Inspection Board Presidency, in the investigation report it prepared on the high-speed train accident in which 9 people died in Ankara; kazanIt was alleged that the train crew officer O. Y forgot to change the scissors and the three YHT mechanics did not stop the train, although they saw that he had taken the wrong path. Against this kazanIn the report, which also points out the 'deficiencies' in the region where the prison is located, insufficient training is given to the detained switchman O.Y; It was listed that no arrangement should be made, such as not employing 1 train staff instead of 2 train staff, not having sufficient signs, calling the command center when the train enters Line 1 and notifying this situation. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the risk of meeting two trains arose with the reorganization of the train traffic in the region 4 days before the accident.
TCDD Inspection Board, 13 2018 9 93 54 XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX The XNUMX page report by Chief Inspector Ahmet Hamdi Yanilmaz and inspector Fatih Demir was sent to Ankara Public Prosecutor Ejder Oguz Ozdemir, who was conducting the investigation with the General Directorate of TCDD.
In the report, kazanAs the first reason, "the arrested train organization officer O.Y sent the train No. 13, which was ready on the YHT Station 2018. Road to make the Ankara-Konya expedition on 06.30 December 11, at 81201, from the Line 1 road. It was claimed that he caused him to go on the Line 2 road instead of what he should have done. In this report, it was stated that O.Y forgot to change the scissors numbered M74, and it was requested that the switchman be dismissed from the civil service.
The second reason was the high-speed train machinists A. Y, HB and K.Ü. who were killed in the accident. YHT 8. In the traffic operating orders published by the Regional Directorate, the YHTs will be given the call of Hat 1 from Ankara YHT Gar-Esenkent direction and Hat 2 from the direction of Esenkent-Ankara YHT Gar and 1 except the road closure of the YHTs. YHT Machinists are known to watch their way.
The report noted the need for additional safety measures in the new application and identified the following three 'shortcomings': Ankara YHT Gar did not make arrangements to train the train by calling the command center when it entered Hat 1.
YHT Garage 23.00 07.00 trainer 1 in the West scissors 2 trainer, rather than the staff of the XNUMX train.
-9 XTRENE 2018 11 12 13 2 1 74 1 and 2 path before connecting to the line XNUMX and XNUMX line connecting the line XNUMX scissors MXNUMX scissors with the direction information and the line XNUMX Line XNUMX information does not indicate the markings.
Scissors training not provided
In the report, “Makasçı O.Y has not been trained within the scope of the directive orders of TCDD, training has been given to O.Y for the use of the scissors assembly with the button numbered M74, and the records and documents to be kept are not kept. while this situation needs to be documented, such a document is not kept ”.
'Condemnation' to the managers
In the report, while requesting 'warn' to other arrested traffic controller EEE, 'offense' sentence for the dispatcher Sinan Yavuz; YHT 8th Regional Manager DY, Traffic and Station Management Manager Ü.S, Traffic and Station Management Assistant Manager ET and Ankara YHT Station Deputy Director K.O was requested.
A second accident prevented by 5
In the report, Sincan-Kayas running Line 2 commuter trains from 45 seconds after the accident came to the station and the stop at the scene 5 meters, stating that a second catastrophe was prevented by stating that was stopped.