Shortly after taking action for the Ankara-Konya expedition, it was revealed that the accident caused by the High Speed Train, which collided with the train on the same line, was caused by the chain of negligence of the accident.
It was understood that the sefer land order ın was carried out on the train line that was opened before it was completed, and the accident occurred every morning because the officials who closed the line of the train train neglected to change the scissors. It was reported that the high-speed train entered this line due to the fact that the guide train was in its usual position, and no change in the scissors was made, and that it was possible to precisely prevent the boiler if the signaling system was present. Due to the early opening of the line before the election, it was understood that the signaling system was still available late in the night. It was learned that one of the deceased was a replacement mechanic who took the train temporarily until Eryaman instead of his broken car.
The first queries of three TCDD employees who were detained in connection with the train crash in Ankara were completed. Three people are expected to be brought to court today or in the evening.
The cause of the accident was the absence of a signaling system. The details on this matter became clear. The suburban flights to the capital and the high speed train services were completed before the election, before the signalization system was completed.
Although the union and TCDD employees warned about ın an accident ına, it was understood that the line had been operated in the form of ın land order CD until today.
It was learned that the signaling system continued to be cut down to the rails and center after midnight and that the workers who were working in limited conditions were unable to complete their work within the prescribed periods.
Scissor not changed
A detention warrant was issued against the action officer SY, the train constituent officer (scissors) OY and the controller EEE.
The reason for the detentions became clear. Accordingly, the high-speed train hit the guide train, as early as early in the morning to check the condition of the rails and the road, and went back to Polatli. After the train returned from its usual route, the switchman took a manual train to the B2 line. However, this line was not closed for some reason. Normally, the line had to be turned off and the B1 line had to be opened for the high-speed train. The high-speed train set out that way and didn't do the necessary checks and hit the guide train where it should be.
In the past by telegraph, now by phone
If the signaling system is found, even if the scissor is not closed, it is learned that this situation can be noticed from the center after the train departs.
It was stated that the system allows the monitoring of all lines, scissors and lights like planes from the center, and that the warning system is activated if there is a second train on the track.
In the system called the Central Administration by phone, it was understood that the telegraphed operations consisted of radio or telephone. According to this, the train station in the relevant place warns the next station after moving, and the station gives information after the train arrives. The system does not have a function to prevent accidents.
Subsequent to the accident, suburban flights were interrupted and the completion of the signaling system was reported.
Your friend got on the spot
Hulusi Böler, who lost his life in the accident, was found to be taking the train to serve only until Eryaman. The assistant mechanic who was on duty at the time was told that the morning car was broken, so he could get on the train from Eryaman, and that it was his duty to go to Eryaman and lost his life in the accident.
Source : txnumx.com.t is